What offenses – if any – must one commit against a rigorous standard of reason to certify theism as a defensible position? In this wide-ranging, engagingly written exploration, Peter Forrest uses the notion of assent and the sort of hypothesis-confirmation methodology familiar in the sciences to arrive at a principled epistemology for a defense that is realist about truth and conforms to regular norms of reasoning.

Evan Fales, Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Iowa, USA

We no longer naively believe in fundamentalisms - in religion, politics, science. But scepticism overreacts, since the universe must be some way and we have many clues. In a masterly synthesis, Forrest fits together the pieces from logic, physics, ethics and religion. We have a reasonable faith that deserves commitment

James Franklin, Professor of Mathematics, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia

Peter Forrest defends commitments--acts of assent--as responses to lack of epistemic innocence concerning disputed philosophical, religious and political questions. After identifying and explaining rules governing reasonable commitments, Forrest argues that it is reasonable to commit to what he calls reason, humanism, and God. While I think that even Forrest would be surprised if many followed him in these commitments, I also think that many will be prepared to follow Forrest part way, ending up with what they take to be reasonable commitments at odds with those that Forrest himself endorses. In that way, Forrest work can meet a condition that he thinks that it must meet if it is to be of value: guiding individuals to make up their own minds.

Graham Oppy, Professor of Philosophy, Monash University, Australia