Lahneman is not optimistic about the continued effectiveness of the US intelligence community in the dynamic and complex security environment in which it operates today. The author notes that the intelligence community is still basically organized around the central task of "learning secrets" from a single, major, state-based threat, using technical means. It is not well situated to solve mysteries arising from multiple, widely dispersed threats of a non-state-supported nature. The contemporary security environment demands greater exploitation of human intelligence and open sources, areas in which the US intelligence community remains demonstrably weak. It is not that the intelligence community has simply refused to change since the Cold War but that the changes in methods and organization have been evolutionary while the changes in the security environment have been revolutionary. What is needed, according to Lahneman, is a "revolution in intelligence affairs." Whether such a revolution is forthcoming remains unclear, but the author's argument is well worth considering nonetheless. Recommended.

Choice Reviews

I recommend the addition of this work to academic or personal libraries of those with an interest in policy and change in the IC. It is an easy read, something that is often a real challenge when debating policy. It also presents cogent and well-documented reasons for change, and acknowledges competing hypotheses. Bill Lahneman deserves congratulations for having the temerity to tackle such a tough issue. Though readers may not agree with all of his perspectives, they are thought-provoking and interesting.

American Military Intelligence Journal

This is a useful work that should stimulate debate on the most effective structure for the U.S. intelligence community.

American Reference Books Annual

William Lahneman’s book is indeed such an ambitious project. . .It is good that Lahneman has consulted a sizable number of experts [including] Jacques Gansler, William Nolte, and George Fidas, among others readily recognizable to the Community. . . .I recommend the addition of this work to academic or personal libraries of those with an interest in policy and change in the IC. It is an easy read, something that is often a real challenge when debating policy. It also presents cogent and well-documented reasons for change, and acknowledges competing hypotheses. Bill Lahneman deserves congratulations for having the temerity to tackle such a tough issue.

American Intelligence Journal