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Description
In ancient times, the main approaches to metaphysical realism were intuitive. In modern times, foundationalism has replaced intuition as the main strategy to make out metaphysical realist claims to know. In On Foundationalism, Rockmore argues that foundationalism fails in all its known variants. Furthermore, Rockmore argues that Kant plays a crucial role in this regard. Kant's complex position is both foundationalist and anti-foundationalist, committed to metaphysical realism, and also, through its commitment to empirical realism, opposed to metaphysical realism. Before Kant, it made eminent sense to be committed to eventually making out a claim for metaphysical realism by formulating an acceptable version of foundationalism. After Kant, it no longer makes sense even to try to do so.
Table of Contents
Chapter 2 Realism, Platonic Realism, Truth and Knowledge
Chapter 3 Epistemological Foundationalism
Chapter 4 Foundationalism as a System
Chapter 5 Foundationalism as Representationalism
Chapter 6 On Recent Foundationalism
Product details
Published | 05 Apr 2004 |
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Format | Hardback |
Edition | 1st |
Extent | 154 |
ISBN | 9780742534278 |
Imprint | Rowman & Littlefield Publishers |
Dimensions | 234 x 157 mm |
Publisher | Bloomsbury Publishing |
About the contributors
Reviews
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Rockmore's pellucid style presents the complex history of a theory in a usefully understated manner. It is a style that cuts through the technical and historical details to expose the basic key positions, yet does so without oversimplifying them.
Review of Metaphysics