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Description
Games of Chicken proposes basing nuclear weapons policies on both historical and analytical arguments. Schwartzman analyzes the trade-off between the aggression risk, which U.S. policy has sought to minimize, and the pre-emption risk, which has been ignored. This analysis is then applied to policy developments under each of the post-war U.S. presidents. The historical analysis also demonstrates the importance of the role of myths in the development of policy, most notably: the myth of the nuclear strategy expert; the evil empire myth; and the economic necessity myth. Finally, the author proposes a viable solution to the increasing build-up of nuclear weapons, one which would minimize the preemption risk.
Table of Contents
Truman's Choice
The Economics of Eisenhower
Kennedy and National Resolve
Nixon the Negotiator
Carter and the MX
Reagan the Continuer
The Debate Goes On
Where to From Here?
Notes
Acronyms
Selected Bibliography
Index
Product details
| Published | Feb 18 1988 |
|---|---|
| Format | Hardback |
| Edition | 1st |
| Extent | 248 |
| ISBN | 9780275928841 |
| Imprint | Praeger |
| Dimensions | 229 x 152 mm |
| Publisher | Bloomsbury Publishing |
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