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No War, No Peace, No Incentives
Political, Economic, and Strategic Bases of Inertia in Russian-Japanese Reconciliation
No War, No Peace, No Incentives
Political, Economic, and Strategic Bases of Inertia in Russian-Japanese Reconciliation
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Description
This book presents three main arguments about Russian-Japanese relations from 2000-2016 and contends hat the lack of incentives for reconciliation by 2035 was a consequence of factors exogenous and endogenous to each government.
No War, No Peace, No Incentives asserts that strides toward genuine, enduring reconciliation by 2035 only could have proceeded from resolution of the territorial and peace treaty disputes but thereafter would have required extensive purposeful reparation of political, economic and strategic (including military) relations to persevere. Second, this book contends that the lack of incentives for reconciliation – as qualified above – by 2035 was a consequence of factors exogenous and endogenous to each government. This book's third main argument also concerns elite aversion to settlement of the Southern Kurils and peace treaty issues from 2000-2016 and thus qualified for both governments as a major endogenous disincentive for reconciliation.
Table of Contents
Chapter 1. Evolution of the Southern Kurils Dispute
Chapter 2. Political Bases of Inertia
Chapter 3. Economic Bases of Inertia
Chapter 4. Strategic Bases of Inertia
Conclusion
About the Author
Index
Product details
| Published | Feb 05 2026 |
|---|---|
| Format | Hardback |
| Edition | 1st |
| Extent | 256 |
| ISBN | 9781498573054 |
| Imprint | Bloomsbury Academic |
| Dimensions | 229 x 152 mm |
| Publisher | Bloomsbury Publishing |
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