Few weapons developed a more deadly reputation than the German '88' in the role of anti-tank gun, its long reach and lethal hitting power making it a significant problem for every type of British and later American armour. Despite its individual potency, it was almost always utilized as part of a comprehensive system of defences that relied on a mix of weapons carefully deployed in anticipation of the enemy's likely avenue and method of attack. Used in this way, the 88 became a particularly deadly part of the Afrika Korps' attempts to shatter British armoured power in the Western Desert.
The British first encountered the 88 on 15 June 1941 at Halfaya Pass during Operation Battleaxe, where the guns took a heavy toll on the ranks of the previously resilient Matilda IIs. In Operation Crusader, launched in November of that same year, the 88 once again showed up the glaring deficiencies in British armour and tactics, problems that were addressed only slowly and in too haphazard a fashion. Further disasters at the Gazala battles in June 1942 marked the nadir of British fortunes when it came to dealing with German anti-tank defences, but improvements in vehicles (like the more reliable American-made M3 and the Crusader III armed with a 6-pdr gun) and tactics (standing off from likely tank traps, using manoeuvre and combined arms to outfight German anti-tank defences) bore fruit at Alam el Halfa in September and again later at El Alamein.
The headlong retreat of the Afrika Korps to the Mareth Line opened up a new front in Southern Tunisia, and with it came a new adversary in the shape of the American 1st Armored Division. The hard-learnt lessons endured by the Eighth Army would now be taught anew to the well-trained but green crews of M3 and M4 tanks at Sidi Bou Zid, where German defensive tactics and battlefield experience resulted in the annihilation of two Combat Commands in two days. Despite their losses, the Americans rapidly reorganized and re-equipped themselves, and in little more than a month were on the offensive once more. Now more cautious of their enemy, the tanks of the 1st Armored made the most of infantry, artillery and air support, with the shortcomings in US armoured doctrine made good by the sheer offensive power of their combined-arms units. Individual 88s were still as effective as ever, but the defensive system within which they operated was gradually stretched beyond endurance, making them vulnerable to a well-equipped enemy who had learned how to minimize the threat posed.