This looks like a text that we might use and make use of across different courses – the Cyberwarfare course and my Russian policy class. That appeals to me. We do that with some of the other books. This is a book that centers cyberwarfare and hybrid warfare against the backdrop of the present conflict between Russia and Ukraine. There is a good likelihood I would consider adopting this book and suggesting it to my colleagues who teach analogous courses. This would be a part of the course, probably 3-4 weeks

Spencer L Willardson, Department of Government, Stephen F. Austin State University

Modern Hybrid Warfare focuses on hybrid warfare and cyber operations much more than my current texts do; they don't really cover those topics well at all. But those are topics that are increasingly important in the modern world. Further, Modern Hybrid Warfare's focus on Russia and Ukraine is quite different than my course, which doesn't really focus on any particular country or countries. But I think this would be of interest to students, as they tend to be quite fascinated with Russia, the Ukraine War, and so on. I'm satisfied with the organization. It doesn't follow the organization of any of my courses because the Strategy and Warfare course covers warfare in general, rather than specifically hybrid warfare, and my courses tend to look at topics in general rather than focused on any particular countries. However, I direct an MA program in Defense and Strategic Studies, and a course organized along the lines of Modern Hybrid Warfare would be a great addition to the program. There's a chance that I would add it to my Strategy and Warfare course. There's probably a better chance that I would seek to add a course on the subject to the MA in Defense and Strategic Studies program that I direct.

Stephen L. Quackenbush, University of Missouri

While the authors are clearly experts in many aspects of hybrid warfare, I am not satisfied with the organization of the proposed manuscript, after finding the timelines to be inconsistent. The Summary states: “during the Post-Soviet Era with a particular emphasis on the Russo-Ukrainian War (2022- ).” while the Description states: “This volume takes 2022 as the starting point...” Chapter 3 starts with “Soviet Union's collapse in 1991,” while Chapter 4 is on “2000-2023.” The work does not identify when Russian Hybrid Warfare actually commenced, maybe in Georgia in 2008 by Russian conventional forces with cyber and influence components, or in Crimea in 2014 with Little Green Men (Special Operations Forces)? Chapter 5 on Cyber Operations says, “Before the February 2022 invasion” and Chapter 7 says “with the meddling in the 2016 US presidential election.” Do the authors plan to devote considerable space to the cyber attacks and influence operations in that US election, or does the volume truly start in 2022 in the ongoing War? Again, the authors intend to ask “what lessons we can learn and what we can anticipate for the future of warfare and conflict” using 2022 as the starting point? I offer that Chapter 2 is a prime model of obtaining that quest, by exploring drone and space technology usage in the ongoing war. The NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence stated in 2019: The term 'hybrid' has been used to describe a wide array of measures, means and techniques including, but not limited to: disinformation; cyber attacks; facilitated migration; espionage; manipulation of international law; threats of force (by both irregular armed groups and conventional forces); political subversion; sabotage; terrorism; economic pressure and energy dependency. The proposed chapters center on cyber operations, energy coercion and the information environment. While the hybrid component of “irregular” military units is mentioned in the Description section and footnote 1 there is no discussion on the role of the Wagner Group in the Russo-Ukrainian war. Likewise, the hybrid component of “economic pressure” is absent, while Russia has initiated a food crisis by restricting the flow of grain from the Black Sea. In addition, the “threat of force” by “conventional forces” was part of diplomatic maneuvering by Russia with the West prior to the invasion. Finally, the Russian justification for their invasion is a “manipulation of international law.” I believe a thorough treatment of the full range of hybrid measures in the ongoing war would best represent the tenets of Modern Hybrid Warfare, by Russia, against the West. [What is the likelihood of you adopting this book if it were written according to the author's proposal and your suggestions?] High

Scott Jasper, Senior Lecturer, Naval Postgraduate School

I currently teach two graduate-level seminars, Cyberspace in Strategy and Grand Strategy and Cyberspace in Modern Warfare. This textbook would be a valuable addition to my syllabi for both of these courses. A key challenge I face in teaching these courses is identifying textbooks and other course material that I can assign that takes more of an empirical perspective to cyber conflict. Modern Hybrid Warfare, therefore, would be a valuable addition to my syllabi as it takes an empirical approach to studying Russian approaches to hybrid warfare. I am satisfied with the organization of Modern Hybrid Warfare. Its organization generally follows the organization of my course in that it tackles history and theory first, and then explores Russian hybrid warfare from a variety of perspectives. My only suggestion for organization is that the authors may want to consider switching the order of chapters 6 and 7, as a discussion of Russian information operations may more naturally follow from the discussion in chapter 5 about Russian cyber operations. Finally, in the conclusion it would be useful for the authors to consider the integration of the disparate Russian approaches that are discussed across chapters 54-7. As Russia is conducting cyber, information, gray zone operations, and economic coercion, to what extent is it integrating these into a broader, more cohesive strategy? This could be a nice way of bringing the discussion back to the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, which opened the book, with an eye toward evaluating implications for the future of conflict. This could also help set the stage for a potential Volume 2, which the authors mention in the proposal. Overall, I would recommend publication of this book. I would describe this text as a comprehensive analysis of modern Russian approaches to hybrid warfare, grounded in an empirical evaluation of Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the post-Cold War history of Russian military operations. It is highly likely that I would adopt this book if it were written according to the authors' proposal.

Erica D. Lonergan, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University

I am not teaching a course on cyber conflict/ cyber warfare, another colleague of mine offers the course. That being said, I teach a course on International Conflict (which has not been offered since 2018) and a course on Politics of Russia (regularly scheduled offering). The proposed manuscript could be a good primary textbook for a specialized course on Cyber Conflict (we have one on the books which is offered every other year by a colleague of mine). I myself would gladly include the manuscript in the list of recommended textbooks. It is a strong manuscript focusing on a narrow set of issues related with Russia's influence and the use of cyberspace, but its content can only be used for a two-three weeks of class activities (lecture, discussion), not for an entire semester. It seems that the format and the organization of the proposed manuscript is pretty standard – it starts with an overview of the work on hybrid warfare and disruptive technology; it then surveys the evolution of US-Soviet and US-Russian rivalry. I don't see a problem working with this manuscript as a supplemental reading. This is an innovative manuscript dealing with Russia' foreign policy and the Moscow's subversive activities in the cyberspace. The likelihood of adopting the textbook as a supplemental reading material is very high. Unfortunately, it would cover 2-3 weeks in the course on Politics of Russia and about 3-4 weeks maximum in the course on International Conflict.

Ivan Dinev Ivanov, School of Public and International Affairs, University of Cincinnati