American foreign aid can be a powerful tool to both to improve lives of people in the developing world, strengthen US allies, and advance the United States' national interest, but it is limited by statutory constraints, bureaucracy, congressional micro-management, and competing visions of what it can and should accomplish. This book explores these limitations – and what can be done about them - through a close analysis of the five “clashes of development”.

The clash of theory and practice discusses the major theories of development, and the influence these have had on the design of aid programs. The clash of development and diplomacy examines the dangers of coopting development programs for purely diplomatic goals. The clash of the counter-bureaucracy describes how quantitative performance indicators and compliance systems have come to dominate USAID at the expense of good development practice. The clash of development and politics shows the dangers of letting domestic agendas drive development decisions, of congressional oversight, and the clash of development and defense demonstrates how using development programs particularly in war zones where the US military is fighting to achieve tactical outcomes leads to programs that are at best ineffective, often fail and are unsustainable. The book is rounded out with chapters discussing how these clashes impact key aspects of implementing development programs, including aid allocation decisions, the selection partner organizations, the management of programs in the field, and risk management. The book concludes with a chapter on what can be done to improve American foreign aid and a focus on why foreign aid is so important when many detractors proclaim “America first.”