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Kant, Ought Implies Can, the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, and Happiness
Kant, Ought Implies Can, the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, and Happiness
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Description
Throughout his corpus, Kant repeatedly and resolutely denies that there is a duty to promote one’s own happiness, and most present-day Kantians seem to agree with him. In Kant, Ought Implies Can, the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, and Happiness, Samuel Kahn argues that this denial rests on two main ideas: (1) a conception of duty that makes the principle of ought implies can (OIC) and the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) analytic, and (2) the claim that humans necessarily promote their own happiness. This book defends OIC and PAP but nonetheless attacks the second idea, and it supplements this attack with two additional arguments—an interpersonal one and an intrapersonal one—for the claim that a modern day Kantian ethics should affirm a duty to promote one’s own happiness.
Table of Contents
Part One. Ought implies can in Kantian ethics
Chapter 1. Terminology and Exegesis
Section 1. Terminology
Section 2. Exegesis
Chapter 2. Arguments in Favor of OIC
Section 1. Kant's argument for OIC
Section 2. The argument from explanation
Section 3. The fairness argument
Section 4. The prescriptivist argument
Section 5. The argument from deontic logic
Chapter 3. Objections to OIC
Section 1. The appeal to alternate traditions
Section 2. The epistemic argument
Section 3. The ordinary language objection
Section 4. The appeal to culpable inability
Section 5. The argument from past obligations
Section 6. The argument from simplicity
Section 7. The argument from excuses
Section 8. The appeal to Hume's principle
Section 9. The argument from reasons
Section 10. The moral satisfaction objection
Section 11. The appeal to obligations from nowhere
Section 12. The argument from interdependence
Section 13. The argument from epistemic oughts
Section 14. The argument
Product details
| Published | 31 Dec 2018 |
|---|---|
| Format | Hardback |
| Edition | 1st |
| Extent | 280 |
| ISBN | 9781498519618 |
| Imprint | Lexington Books |
| Dimensions | 231 x 165 mm |
| Publisher | Bloomsbury Publishing |
About the contributors
Reviews
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Samuel Kahn’s book is a wide-ranging and provocative discussion of important issues in normative ethics, metaethics and moral psychology. It contains thoughtful and cogent discussions not only of Kant and the Kant literature, but also of contemporary treatments of the moral ought, responsibility and the place of happiness among human ends. Kahn provides an engaging introduction to all these themes.
Allen Wood, Indiana University Bloomington
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Samuel Kahn explores one of the most puzzling but under-theorized aspects of Kant’s ethics: the nature and moral importance of human happiness. Against most readings, Kahn contends that not only was Kant wrong to insist that a person could have no moral duty to promote her own happiness, but also that his own views entail that we do. Kahn brings Kant’s ethics into a sustained and illuminating conversation with the extensive contemporary literature on the relationship between obligation, blameworthiness, and the possibility of fulfilling (or failing to fulfill) the demands of morality. This encyclopedic work will be a valuable resource not just for those interested in Kant’s practical philosophy, but for anyone concerned with the moral significance of our physical and psychological limitations.
David Sussman, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
ONLINE RESOURCES
Bloomsbury Collections
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