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Description
The commission to investigate the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States issued its final report in July of 2004, in which it recommended a dramatic overhaul of the nation's intelligence system. Congress responded by hastily enacting the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which adopts many of the 9/11 commission's specific recommendations, though with a number of alterations. Richard A. Posner, in the first full-length study of the post-9/11 movement for intelligence reform, argues that the 9/11 commission's analysis, on which Congress relied, was superficial and its organizational proposals unsound. The commission, followed by Congress, exaggerated the benefits of centralizing control over intelligence; neglected the relevant scholarship dealing with surprise attacks, organization theory, the principles of intelligence, and the experience of foreign nations, some of which have a longer history of fighting terrorism than the United States; and as a result ignored the psychological, economic, historical, sociological, and comparative dimensions of the issue of intelligence reform.
Posner explains, however, that a ray of hope remains: the reorganization provisions of the new Act are so vague, as a result of intense politicking, that the actual shape of the reorganized system will depend critically on decisions made by the President in implementing the Act. In a searing critique, Posner exposes the pitfalls created by the new legislation, identifies the issues overlooked by the 9/11 commission and Congress, and suggests directions for real reform.
This book is published in cooperation with the Hoover Institution
Table of Contents
Part 2 Introduction
Part 3 Part I: From the 9/11 Commission's Report to the Intelligence Reform Act
Chapter 4 1. The Commission's Organizational Recommendations
Chapter 5 2. The Congressional Response
Part 6 Part II: Toward the Optimal Organization of the U.S. Intelligence System
Chapter 7 3. The History and Anatomy of Successful Surprise Attacks
Chapter 8 4. The Principles of Intelligence
Chapter 9 5. The Principles of Organization
Chapter 10 6. Lessons from the Organization of Intelligence in Other Countries
Part 11 Conclusion: What Is to Be Done?
Product details
| Published | 22 Mar 2005 |
|---|---|
| Format | Ebook (Epub & Mobi) |
| Edition | 1st |
| Extent | 226 |
| ISBN | 9781461666059 |
| Imprint | Rowman & Littlefield Publishers |
| Series | Hoover Studies in Politics, Economics, and Society |
| Publisher | Bloomsbury Publishing |
About the contributors
Reviews
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Richard Posner has tackled head on-and found dangerously flawed-the new law on our national intelligence system. His combination of scholarship, realism about the impossibility of preventing surprise attacks such as that on 9/11, and highlighting of the perils of centralizing intelligence authority, makes this an important and most timely book. Ambiguities in the law leave scope for interpretation by the Executive branch and Posner's trenchant analysis points the way to averting some of the worst hazards.
Henry Rowen, senior fellow of the Hoover Institution; former chairman of the National Intelligence Council, 1981-1983
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A bold new work that is a welcome antidote to the commission fatigue that is settling over Washington. Posner's demystification of the 9/11 commission and of the role of the September 11 families . . . is timely and pertinent. You can't read this book and come away believing that Congress has fixed the problem.
Jim Hoagland, columnist, Washington Post
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"Preventing Surprise Attacks" provides a... useful and contrarian view of the commision report.
Eric Lichtblau, The New York Times
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Posner trenchantly takes to task the grandstanding 9/11 commission. The picture painted by this useful book is pessimistic but not dire. Preempting another 9/11 would be difficult. But, as Posner argues, to the limited extent intelligence structure many factor in, the new legislation has enough play in the joints to allow competent actors to operate.
Andrew McCarthy, New York Post
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In this concise book, Posner...critically unravels the foundations of the 9/11 Commission report and shows defects in..the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004....substantially enhances the public debate about intelligence reform."
Steven Puro, St., Library Journal
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It's fitting that Posner sits on the federal bench, where the Constitution guarantees jurists life tenure, and a salary that can never be reduced. A critic this honest, piercing, and unforgiving would otherwise have a short tenure in Washington, D.C.
David White, American Enterprise

























