Raef Zreik shows that Kant’s use of the concept of autonomy as the underlying principle of both theoretical and practical philosophy has to be distinguished from the idea of autonomous domains of virtue, happiness, and law within practical philosophy. He argues carefully and convincingly that the idea of autonomy is crucial to Kant’s approach to each of these domains but that to think of them as completely separate from each other is a mistake that undermines the unity of Kant’s own philosophy and a coherent approach to practical philosophy in general. This is the most extensive and thorough interpretation and critique of Kant’s use of the concept of autonomy that I know.

Paul Guyer, Brown University & University of Pennsylvania

Zreik’s account of the implicit structure of Kant on morality, justice, law, and virtue is brilliant and original, not least because he brings Kant into conversation with contemporary post-Realist legal theory and the debates regarding the autonomy of law. It is clear and concise and comprehensive and full of new insights. It is an ideal introduction to the most demanding and also puzzling dimensions of Kant as a philosopher of freedom.

Duncan Kennedy, Harvard Law School

Raef Zreik has written a remarkably original book on Kant's practical philosophy. Writing in an easily accessible prose, he demonstrates the centrality of the concept of autonomy to every element of Kant's project, linking his views on theory and practice to his views on law and revolution. Autonomy is, for Zreik, the master concept that cannot quite do the work asked of it. Those limits ask us to rethink the necessity of politics and the role of judgement.

Paul W. Kahn, Yale University