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Description
Rising sectarian tensions, deepening poverty, and growing unemployment have been intertwined and compounded with the COVID-19 pandemic and corruption, to create a conducive environment for instability in Lebanon. Drawing on a survey-based research design, Isaac E. Andakian tests hopes and fears, social dominance orientation, and levels of social cohesion among various sectarian groups to gauge their responses to crises. Lebanon's Year of Crisis (2019-2020): Unity in Adversity explores how shared experiences of four great shocks-the 2019 financial crisis, the October 2019 uprising, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Beirut Port Explosion of August 4, 2020- shape respondents' sectarian, political, and demographic identities. Andakian looks to the future to assess whether conflict, or even the resumption of civil war, stemming from Hezbollah's constant threats to use its military capabilities domestically, can be anticipated.
Table of Contents
List of figures
List of tables
Preface
Introduction
What Is Happening in Lebanon Since 2019?
The Case Study: Zahle.
The Way Forward and The Structure of The Subsequent Chapters.
Chapter 1: Lebanon (1990- March 2005): Reconstruction, Political Transition, And Socioeconomic Challenges Through Sectarian Corruption
1.1 The Taif Agreement and The Reiteration of The Sectarian Political System.
1.2 Liberal Peacebuilding and Corruption Nexus in Post-War Lebanon
1.3 Corruption-led Poverty and Inequalities in Lebanon.
1.4 Sectarianism And the Provision of Basic Public Goods and Services.
Chapter 2: Lebanon's Decline (April 2005-2018): Assassinations, Hezbollah, and Changing Sociopolitical and Economic Dynamics
Chapter 3: Lebanon October 2019 Onward: Shattered Foundations and the Rebirth of the Phoenix
3.1 The 2019 Uprising.
3.2 The Economic Meltdown and The Devaluation of The Local Currency
3.3 COVID-19 Pandemic's Impact on Lebanon's Economy.
3.4 The Beirut Port Explosion.
3.5 How Are the Four Shocks Impacting the Daily Lives of Ordinary Lebanese?
3.6 The 2019 Financial Collapse.
3.7 Corruption is the common factor among the four shocks
Chapter 4: Post-Civil War Legacies and Liberal Peacebuilding Realities
4.1 Liberal Peacebuilding.
4.2 Structural Violence.
4.3 Identity Politics, Nationalism, and Social Dominance Orientation Theory.
4.3.1 Lebanon: A state, not a nation.
4.3.2 Social Dominance Theory
4.4 The Human Needs Theory.
4.5 Hope: Why is Hope So Important in Conflicts And Times Of Despair?
4.5.1 The Audacity of Hope.
4.5.2 The Politics of Hope from Thucydides to the 21st Century.
4.5.3 What Could Hope Mean to the Lebanese People?
4.6 Social Cohesion.
4.6.1 Defining Social Cohesion.
4.6.2 Social Cohesion and Conflict.
4.6.3 Social Cohesion in Lebanon.
Chapter 5: Lebanese Hopes, Fears, And the Causes of The 2019 Financial Collapse
5.1 Best Hopes and Wishes for Lebanon.
5.2 Worst Fears for Lebanon: Civil War, Hezbollah, Hopelessness, And Migration.
5.2.1 The Fear of Civil War.
5.2.2 The Fear of Hezbollah.
5.2.3 Hopelessness.
5.2.4 Migration.
5.2.5 Respondents' Quotes Regarding Fear of Civil War, Hezbollah, And Hopelessness
5.3 Best Hopes and Wishes for Self
5.3.1 Healthcare.
5.3.2 Migration
5.3.4 Respondents' Quotes and Further Analysis Regarding Hope for Healthcare and Migration
5.4 Worst Fears for Self.
5.4.1 Hopelessness.
5.4.2 Healthcare.
5.4.3 Migration
5.4.4 Respondents' Quotes and Further Analysis Regarding Self-Fears for Hopelessness and Healthcare.
5.5 The Causes of the Current Situation.
5.5.1 Rulers
5.5.2 Corruption
5.5.3 Thefts
5.5.4 Sectarianism
5.5.5 Political Parties.
5.5.6 Electorates
5.5.7 Respondents' Quotes and Further Analysis Regarding the Answers to The Causes of The Current Situation.
Appendix 1: Tables of Chapter 5
Chapter 6: Perceptions of Personal and Lebanon's Future, Social Cohesion, and Nationalism
6.1 Is There Any Difference Between Christian and Muslim Sectarian Groups About Being More Hopeful For Their Future And The Future Of Lebanon?
6.2 How Does Lebanon's Future Look Like?
6.2.1 Phase 1
6.2.2 Phase 2
6.3 Self's Future.
6.3.1 Phase 1
6.3.2 Phase 2
6.4 Does the Troika Group (Maronites, Sunnis, and Shiites) have Higher Social Dominance Orientation?
6.4.1 Phase 1
6.4.2 Phase 2
6.5 Social Cohesion
6.5.1 Phase 1
6.5.2 Phase 2
6.6 Are Socially Cohesive Groups More Hopeful for Lebanon and Self?
6.7 Would Respondents who are Less Hopeful for Their Future and The Future of Lebanon be More Likely to Leave Lebanon (Flight)? Conversely, Would Respondents who are More Hopeful for Their Future and The Future of Lebanon be More Likely to Stay in Lebanon (Fight)?
6.8 Are Those Who Feel Less Socially Cohesive More Inclined to Migrate.
6.9 Is Social Cohesion Greater Among Sectarian Groups (Intra-Sectarian Cohesion) Than Between Sectarian Groups (Inter-Sectarian Cohesion)? Is Horizontal Social Cohesion Greater Within Sectarian Groups (Intra-Sectarian Cohesion) Than Between Sectarian Groups (Inter-Sectarian Cohesion)?
6.10 Does Social Cohesion Reduces the Likelihood of Conflict Escalation.
6.11 Are Classical Identities (Phoenicianism, Arabism, and Wilayat-Al-Faqih) Still Prevalent in Lebanon?
6.12 Does “All of Them” Really Mean “All of Them”?
Appendix 2: Tables of Chapter 6
Chapter 7: Lebanon's Future; Extremely Difficult but Not Impossible
7.1 Hopes Are Very Basic.
7.2 Fears Of Violence and Civil War Are Serious.
7.3 Corrupt Sectarian Politics Is the Main Cause of the Current Situation.
7.4 The Future Is Not Very Promising.
7.5 Social Dominance Orientation: Domination of Sectarian Identities and Age Groups.
7.6 Lack of Social Cohesion Is a Potential Driver for Conflict.
7.7 Unequal Provision of Public Goods and Services Increases the Potential for Conflict.
7.8 Unity in Tragedy? Economic But Not Ideational.
7.9 Lebanese Want to Be “Lebanese”.
Conclusion
Limitations of the Research
References
Appendix 3: The Survey Questionnaire
Appendix 4: The Code Book Regarding the Qualitative Questions about Hopes, Fears, and Causes of The Current Issues
About the Author
List of tables
Preface
Introduction
What Is Happening in Lebanon Since 2019?
The Case Study: Zahle.
The Way Forward and The Structure of The Subsequent Chapters.
Chapter 1: Lebanon (1990- March 2005): Reconstruction, Political Transition, And Socioeconomic Challenges Through Sectarian Corruption
1.1 The Taif Agreement and The Reiteration of The Sectarian Political System.
1.2 Liberal Peacebuilding and Corruption Nexus in Post-War Lebanon
1.3 Corruption-led Poverty and Inequalities in Lebanon.
1.4 Sectarianism And the Provision of Basic Public Goods and Services.
Chapter 2: Lebanon's Decline (April 2005-2018): Assassinations, Hezbollah, and Changing Sociopolitical and Economic Dynamics
Chapter 3: Lebanon October 2019 Onward: Shattered Foundations and the Rebirth of the Phoenix
3.1 The 2019 Uprising.
3.2 The Economic Meltdown and The Devaluation of The Local Currency
3.3 COVID-19 Pandemic's Impact on Lebanon's Economy.
3.4 The Beirut Port Explosion.
3.5 How Are the Four Shocks Impacting the Daily Lives of Ordinary Lebanese?
3.6 The 2019 Financial Collapse.
3.7 Corruption is the common factor among the four shocks
Chapter 4: Post-Civil War Legacies and Liberal Peacebuilding Realities
4.1 Liberal Peacebuilding.
4.2 Structural Violence.
4.3 Identity Politics, Nationalism, and Social Dominance Orientation Theory.
4.3.1 Lebanon: A state, not a nation.
4.3.2 Social Dominance Theory
4.4 The Human Needs Theory.
4.5 Hope: Why is Hope So Important in Conflicts And Times Of Despair?
4.5.1 The Audacity of Hope.
4.5.2 The Politics of Hope from Thucydides to the 21st Century.
4.5.3 What Could Hope Mean to the Lebanese People?
4.6 Social Cohesion.
4.6.1 Defining Social Cohesion.
4.6.2 Social Cohesion and Conflict.
4.6.3 Social Cohesion in Lebanon.
Chapter 5: Lebanese Hopes, Fears, And the Causes of The 2019 Financial Collapse
5.1 Best Hopes and Wishes for Lebanon.
5.2 Worst Fears for Lebanon: Civil War, Hezbollah, Hopelessness, And Migration.
5.2.1 The Fear of Civil War.
5.2.2 The Fear of Hezbollah.
5.2.3 Hopelessness.
5.2.4 Migration.
5.2.5 Respondents' Quotes Regarding Fear of Civil War, Hezbollah, And Hopelessness
5.3 Best Hopes and Wishes for Self
5.3.1 Healthcare.
5.3.2 Migration
5.3.4 Respondents' Quotes and Further Analysis Regarding Hope for Healthcare and Migration
5.4 Worst Fears for Self.
5.4.1 Hopelessness.
5.4.2 Healthcare.
5.4.3 Migration
5.4.4 Respondents' Quotes and Further Analysis Regarding Self-Fears for Hopelessness and Healthcare.
5.5 The Causes of the Current Situation.
5.5.1 Rulers
5.5.2 Corruption
5.5.3 Thefts
5.5.4 Sectarianism
5.5.5 Political Parties.
5.5.6 Electorates
5.5.7 Respondents' Quotes and Further Analysis Regarding the Answers to The Causes of The Current Situation.
Appendix 1: Tables of Chapter 5
Chapter 6: Perceptions of Personal and Lebanon's Future, Social Cohesion, and Nationalism
6.1 Is There Any Difference Between Christian and Muslim Sectarian Groups About Being More Hopeful For Their Future And The Future Of Lebanon?
6.2 How Does Lebanon's Future Look Like?
6.2.1 Phase 1
6.2.2 Phase 2
6.3 Self's Future.
6.3.1 Phase 1
6.3.2 Phase 2
6.4 Does the Troika Group (Maronites, Sunnis, and Shiites) have Higher Social Dominance Orientation?
6.4.1 Phase 1
6.4.2 Phase 2
6.5 Social Cohesion
6.5.1 Phase 1
6.5.2 Phase 2
6.6 Are Socially Cohesive Groups More Hopeful for Lebanon and Self?
6.7 Would Respondents who are Less Hopeful for Their Future and The Future of Lebanon be More Likely to Leave Lebanon (Flight)? Conversely, Would Respondents who are More Hopeful for Their Future and The Future of Lebanon be More Likely to Stay in Lebanon (Fight)?
6.8 Are Those Who Feel Less Socially Cohesive More Inclined to Migrate.
6.9 Is Social Cohesion Greater Among Sectarian Groups (Intra-Sectarian Cohesion) Than Between Sectarian Groups (Inter-Sectarian Cohesion)? Is Horizontal Social Cohesion Greater Within Sectarian Groups (Intra-Sectarian Cohesion) Than Between Sectarian Groups (Inter-Sectarian Cohesion)?
6.10 Does Social Cohesion Reduces the Likelihood of Conflict Escalation.
6.11 Are Classical Identities (Phoenicianism, Arabism, and Wilayat-Al-Faqih) Still Prevalent in Lebanon?
6.12 Does “All of Them” Really Mean “All of Them”?
Appendix 2: Tables of Chapter 6
Chapter 7: Lebanon's Future; Extremely Difficult but Not Impossible
7.1 Hopes Are Very Basic.
7.2 Fears Of Violence and Civil War Are Serious.
7.3 Corrupt Sectarian Politics Is the Main Cause of the Current Situation.
7.4 The Future Is Not Very Promising.
7.5 Social Dominance Orientation: Domination of Sectarian Identities and Age Groups.
7.6 Lack of Social Cohesion Is a Potential Driver for Conflict.
7.7 Unequal Provision of Public Goods and Services Increases the Potential for Conflict.
7.8 Unity in Tragedy? Economic But Not Ideational.
7.9 Lebanese Want to Be “Lebanese”.
Conclusion
Limitations of the Research
References
Appendix 3: The Survey Questionnaire
Appendix 4: The Code Book Regarding the Qualitative Questions about Hopes, Fears, and Causes of The Current Issues
About the Author
Product details
| Published | Sep 03 2026 |
|---|---|
| Format | Ebook (Epub & Mobi) |
| Edition | 1st |
| Extent | 1 |
| ISBN | 9781978769823 |
| Imprint | Bloomsbury Academic |
| Illustrations | 11 figures, 16 tables. |
| Series | Conflict and Security in the Developing World |
| Publisher | Bloomsbury Publishing |
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