During the presidential administrations of Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy the United States slipped from a position of massive nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union to one of perceived mutual vulnerability. Drawing extensively upon archival materials, Andreas Wenger, a leading young Swiss analyst of world politics, argues that these were the decisive years of the nuclear era, the years when the most

Nuclear Learning

Thoroughly researched and well argued, this book makes a major contribution to the literature.

R. L. Wendzel, United States Air University

This is a meticulously researched and well-written analysis of a very important historical period, and of a very important set of issues involving nuclear history. It makes new contributions in many areas, and addresses several perennial questions and sheds much new light on them. . . . Highly recommended to historians of the nuclear age, and to students pursuing research topics in this area or time period. It provides all researchers a wealth of new information and quotes.

Niall Michelsen, Roosevelt University

Wenger's highly readable account comes as close as historians are likely to get to an authoritative retelling of a complex past.

Richard H. Ullman, Princeton University

Wenger narrates a compelling account of the political and psycological forces that shaped the nuclear weapons strategies of Eisenhower and Kennedy. Wenger convincingly demonstrates that the level of destruction inherent in nuclear use created a gap between the theory and pratice of nuclear strategy. Wenger contributes a timely reminder of these realities and the continuing importance of the past for comtemporary nuclear debates.

Patricia Ownes, Cambridge Review of International Affairs

Historians and political scientists will find new insights into the debate surrounding the Cold War and American policy based on deterrence and change . . . a real tour de force.

Joseph Richard Goldman, University of Minnesota