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The past few decades have witnessed a proliferation of economic sanctions, yet there seem to be few examples of sanctions meeting sender states’ goals. Under what conditions do sanctions fail to change the behavior of so-called international “pariah states,” countries who violate various international norms? This book examines the impact of economic sanctions on target states’ trading relationships through social network analysis, a method that has rarely been applied to the study of sanctions. Drawing on UN Comtrade data, Trading with Pariahs: Trade Networks and the Failure of Economic Sanctions shows that the imposition of sanctions can drastically change some states’ trading networks, as states either find new trading partners (in the case of North Korea) or feel the sting of the sanctions from key trading partners (like Iran). Trading networks (such as Myanmar’s) remain relatively stable over time as key trading partners refuse to impose sanctions. Through the theory of weaponized interdependence, Keith A. Preble and Charmaine N. Willis argue that the success or failure of sanctions to change target states’ behavior depends on who imposes the sanctions. Sanctions imposed by the “right” sender states can be successful but also cannot rely solely on policies of isolation to achieve the goals of the sanctions.
Published | Aug 22 2024 |
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Format | Hardback |
Edition | 1st |
Extent | 200 |
ISBN | 9781666903737 |
Imprint | Lexington Books |
Illustrations | 33 b/w illustrations; 7 tables |
Dimensions | 9 x 6 inches |
Publisher | Bloomsbury Publishing |
“Through innovative network analysis and detailed case studies, Preble and Willis show how features of trade networks influence the success or failure of economic sanctions. The book provides an important advance in understanding of the ability of countries to withstand economic pressure.”
Jordan Tama, American University
“Keith Preble and Charmaine Willis’s Trading with Pariahs is an incisive contribution to our understanding of the effectiveness of sanctions. They have written a fascinating book that delves into the trade networks that three of the most critical pariah states – Iran, North Korea, and Myanmar -- create and exploit to evade sanctions. Using innovative network analysis methods, Preble and Willis show that weaponizing economic interdependence, the primary mechanism by which economic sanctions are supposed to ‘work,’ is most effective when the pariah state is enmeshed in trade networks with the sanctioning states it cannot easily change. States with limited trade networks with sanctioning states, and greater adaptability in their trading partners, can mitigate their own pain, and the ability of other states to monitor them.”
Justin Hastings, University of Sydney
“Sanctions are preferred tools for weaponizing interdependence against countries that break international rules — but even in a liberalized global order, economic sanctions can be blunt instruments. Much depends on the nuances of network structures, as Preble and Willis capably demonstrate in this exciting new book. With its approachable prose and informative visuals, Trading with Pariahs illuminates sanctions (in)effectiveness for observers of international relations at all levels. Sure to take on new relevance as trade networks are transformed by friendshoring, regionalization, and revisionism, this book is essential reading for everyone interested in global security, multilateralism, and the maintenance of international order.”
Jon DiCicco, Middle Tennessee State University
Trading with Pariahs: The Realities of Economic Sanctions in Global Diplomacy by Keith Preble and Charmaine Willis explores of the complexities that arise when using economic sanctions against pariah states. Using historical case studies and engaging with contemporary events, the authors shines a light the networks that pariah states rely on to evade sanctions pressure. Trading with Pariahs serves as a wake-up call, highlighting the moral ambiguities and strategic pitfalls of engaging with outlaw regimes through economic means. It has much to offer scholars and policymakers seeking a deeper understanding of the complexities and trade-offs inherent in engaging with states who have made them outcasts from the global system.
Susan H. Allen, University of Mississippi
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